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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 In Major League Baseball, an umpire calls a “strike.”  
Three strikes and the batter is out.  Similarly, the in forma 
pauperis (“IFP”) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides 
that prisoners may proceed in federal court without 
prepayment of filing fees, contains a “three-strikes rule.”  
Courts may call a strike when a prisoner’s “action or appeal . . . 
was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]”  28 
U.S.C. § 1915(g).  Three strikes and the prisoner cannot 
proceed IFP unless other conditions are present.  See id.   
 The threshold question presented by the instant appeal 
is whether Appellant Quintez Talley has accrued three strikes.  
Appellees1 contend that Talley has at least three strikes based 
on prior “mixed dismissals” where various district courts 
dismissed Talley’s federal claims on grounds enumerated in 
§ 1915(g) and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over Talley’s state law claims.  We hold that such mixed 
dismissals are not strikes.   
 
1 The following individuals are Appellees: John E. Wetzel, the 
Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections, Bruce Beemer, Sharon Rogers, 
Jessica Davis, Caleb Enerson, Robert Gilmore, Tracy Shawley, 
Mindy Andretti, Tammy Ferguson, Rodney Chism, David 
Link, Kevin McElwain, Robert Williamson, Michael Worstell, 
Michael Lefebvre, Ronald Hagg, Dustin Pope, Dean Bowman, 
Thomas Suchta, Joshua Glessner, Daniel Moses, Robert Smith, 
and Gerald Criswell.  
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 Although we are not umpires, we conclude that Talley 
has not struck out.  We will grant his motion for IFP status.   
 On the merits of his appeal, Talley objects to the District 
Court’s grant of Appellees’ motion to dismiss and its denial of 
his motion to amend.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  
I. Background 
 Talley is a prisoner currently incarcerated in a state 
prison in Pennsylvania.  The instant suit arises out of the 
settlement of two of Talley’s prior suits:  Talley v. Glessner 
(Talley I), No. 15-cv-00407 (M.D. Pa.); and Talley v. Wetzel 
(Talley II), No. 15-cv-01170 (M.D. Pa.).  Talley signed a 
settlement agreement resolving both cases (the “Settlement 
Agreement”).  He alleges that the Settlement Agreement was 
fraudulent because Jessica Davis and Sharon Rogers, both of 
whom are attorneys, had not entered a “‘proper’ appearance” 
on behalf of Michael Worstell, a defendant in Talley II.  Compl. 
¶¶ 22, 23.  Talley also alleges that another attorney, Caleb 
Enerson, breached the Settlement Agreement when he filed the 
Settlement Agreement as an exhibit to a motion in Talley II.   
 Talley asserts a claim for violations of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 
U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., as well as claims for violations of the 
First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution.  Talley also brings numerous state law claims:  
defamation, breach of contract, conversion, promissory 
estoppel, fraud/deceit, coercion, and legal malpractice.  Talley 
alleges that Appellees engaged in a conspiracy to violate 
federal and state law.   
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 Appellees moved to dismiss Talley’s complaint 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 
Talley moved to amend.  In a report and recommendation, 
Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick recommended that the 
District Court grant the motion to dismiss and deny the motion 
to amend.  Overruling Talley’s objections, the District Court 
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations, finding that 
(1) Talley’s claims related to the alleged falsity of the 
Settlement Agreement were subject to dismissal because Davis 
had entered a permissible appearance on behalf of Worstell by 
signing and filing an answer on behalf of Worstell and other 
defendants, and (2) Talley’s RICO and constitutional claims 
were meritless because the Settlement Agreement was never 
actually filed on the docket.  The District Court denied Talley 
leave to amend his federal claims, finding that because the 
claims were meritless, amendment of Talley’s complaint 
would be futile.  The District Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Talley’s state law claims, 
dismissing them without prejudice.  This timely appeal 
followed.   
 On September 27, 2019, Talley moved to proceed IFP 
in this appeal.  Appellees opposed Talley’s motion, arguing 
that Talley had accumulated three strikes under § 1915(g).  A 
two-judge panel appointed amicus curiae on behalf of Talley 
to address “whether a strike accrues where a district court 
dismisses a prisoner’s federal claims on one or more grounds 
covered by § 1915(g) but declines to exercise supplemental 
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jurisdiction over the prisoner’s state-law claims.”2  Talley’s 
IFP motion was referred to this merits panel.  
II. Jurisdiction  
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Talley’s RICO 
and constitutional claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1337, and supplemental jurisdiction over Talley’s state law 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
III. Discussion 
 Before we address the merits of Talley’s appeal, we 
must determine whether he can proceed IFP.   
A. Talley’s IFP 
 Appellees contend that Talley accumulated a strike in 
each of the following matters:3  
 
2 We thank amicus curiae, Andrew M. Buttaro, Esq. and 
Jonathan M. Albano, Esq. for their superb advocacy in this 
case. 
3 In their initial response to Talley’s IFP motion, Appellees also 
argued that Talley accrued a strike in Talley v. Clark, No. 18-
5316 (E.D. Pa.).  Talley appealed the district court’s dismissal, 
and we reversed and remanded the district court’s order.  See 
Talley v. Clark, No. 20-1298, 2021 WL 1400911, at *5 (3d Cir. 
Apr. 14, 2021).  Appellees, accordingly, no longer rely on the 
district court’s disposition of that case as a strike.   
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1. Talley v. Varner (“Varner I”), No. 3:17-cv-965 (M.D. 
Pa.), in which the “district court dismissed all of [Talley’s] 
federal law claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6), but, ‘to the extent that the amended 
complaint assert[ed] any state law causes of action,’” the 
district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over those causes 
of action.  Appellees’ IFP Resp. 7 (quoting Varner I, No. 3:17-
cv-965, 2019 WL 1405403, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2019)).   
2. Talley v. Varner (“Varner II”), No. 19-1827 (3d Cir.) in 
which we summarily affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
Talley’s federal claims in Varner I.  See Talley v. Varner, 786 
F. App’x 326 (3d Cir. 2019).  
3. Talley v. Mazzocca, No. 19-00161 (W.D. Pa.), in which 
the district court dismissed Talley’s federal claims with 
prejudice for “failure to state a claim pursuant to the screening 
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A” and 
dismissed his state law claims without prejudice for “want of 
jurisdiction.”  Appellees’ Merits Br. 11; Talley v. Mazzocca, 
No. CV 19-161, 2019 WL 2024829, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 8, 
2019).  
 Appellees describe the dismissals in the instant suit, 
Varner I, and Talley v. Mazzocca as “mixed dismissals” and 
contend such dismissals are strikes.4  Appellees’ Merits Br. 11.  
The question before us is whether mixed dismissals—where a 
district court dismisses a prisoner’s federal claims on grounds 
 
4 Appellees contend that Talley has three other strikes resulting 
from mixed dismissals in: Talley v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 18-
cv-1685 (W.D. Pa.); Talley v. Clark, No. 18-5315 (E.D. Pa.); 
and Talley v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 19-1589 (E.D. Pa.).   
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enumerated in § 1915(g) and declines to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the prisoner’s state law claims—count as 
strikes.  Appellees’ IFP Resp. 8–9.   
 Amici explain that the text of § 1915(g) “plainly states 
what qualifies as a strike—a prior ‘action or appeal’ brought 
by the prisoner ‘that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.’”  Amicus Br. 12 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(g)).  Because “these three grounds are the only grounds 
that can render a dismissal a strike,” Talley’s prior mixed 
dismissals should not count as strikes.  Amicus Br. 12–13.  
Talley advances the same argument.  We agree with Amici and 
Talley.  
 Our analysis of whether mixed dismissals count as 
strikes “begins, and pretty much ends, with the text of Section 
1915(g).”  Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1724 
(2020).  We begin, as we must, with the statutory text.  See A.A. 
v. Att’y Gen. United States, 973 F.3d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(“We ‘presume[] that Congress expresse[d] its intent through 
the ordinary meaning of its language,’ so ‘every exercise of 
statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the plain 
language of the statute.’”  (alterations in original) (quoting 
Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 302 (3d 
Cir. 2011))).   
Section 1915(g) reads: 
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or 
appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding 
under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or 
more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 
detained in any facility, brought an action or 
9 
 
appeal in a court of the United States that was 
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, 
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is 
under imminent danger of serious physical 
injury. 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added).  The emphasized 
statutory language has a plain meaning and permits only one 
interpretation—a strike accrues when an “action or appeal” 
was dismissed on one or more of the three enumerated 
grounds: if the action or appeal is (1) “frivolous,” (2) 
“malicious,” or (3) “fails to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).   
 Thus, the plain text of § 1915(g) precludes Appellees’ 
view that a mixed dismissal is a strike.  That is because a mixed 
dismissal is not a dismissal of the action on one or more of the 
three enumerated grounds.  Rather, a mixed dismissal is a 
dismissal of a portion of the action on enumerated grounds and 
dismissal of the remainder of the action on grounds other than 
the enumerated grounds.  In other words, a mixed dismissal 
does not comply with the rule we announced in Byrd v. 
Shannon, “a strike under § 1915(g) will accrue only if the 
entire action or appeal is . . . dismissed explicitly because it is 
‘frivolous,’ ‘malicious,’ or ‘fails to state a claim[.]’”  715 F.3d 
117, 126 (3d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(g)).   
 The D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have reached the 
same conclusion—a mixed dismissal is not a strike.  See 
Fourstar v. Garden City Grp., Inc., 875 F.3d 1147, 1150–51 
(D.C. Cir. 2017); Harris v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 
2019).  Four other Circuit Courts have considered whether a 
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dismissal on grounds enumerated in § 1915(g), in part, and 
grounds not enumerated in § 1915(g), in part, are not strikes.  
See Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1012 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646, 652 (4th Cir. 2011); Brown 
v. Megg, 857 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2017); Escalera v. 
Samaritan Vill., 938 F.3d 380, 382 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 Despite the plain text of § 1915(g), our holding in Byrd, 
and the weight of authority from our sister Circuits, Appellees 
advance four unpersuasive arguments in support of their view 
that a mixed dismissal is a strike.  We address each in turn. 
 First, Appellees contend that when a district court 
dismisses a prisoner’s federal claims, “the ‘entire action’ has 
been dismissed, because, under this Court’s jurisprudence, the 
district court has lost jurisdiction over any pendent state law 
claims and any assertion to the contrary would itself be 
frivolous.”  Appellees’ IFP Resp. 3–4; see Appellees’ Merits 
Br. 21–22 (clarifying that their use of the phrase “entire action” 
is a reference to Byrd).  Appellees’ interpretation of the phrase 
“entire action,” in effect, invites us to limit the statutory phrase 
“an action or appeal” to only refer to a prisoner’s federal 
claims.  But we have previously interpreted the meaning of “an 
action or appeal” more broadly and rejected a party’s attempt 
to limit the plain meaning of the text.  See Byrd, 715 F.3d at 
121.   
 In Byrd, the prisoner argued that two prior actions, 
which were dismissed for failure to state a claim, were not 
strikes because he did not proceed IFP in those actions.  715 
F.3d at 121.  We found that “the statutory language has a 
reasonably plain meaning—‘an action or appeal’ is not limited 
to an IFP action or appeal; rather, it refers to both IFP and non-
IFP actions or appeals.”  Id. at 123.  We rejected the prisoner’s 
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argument because the text of § 1915(g) did not allow for his 
proffered interpretation.  Id. at 124 (“Congress could have 
easily differentiated between IFP and non-IFP actions or 
appeals in the language of § 1915(g), but it did not.”).  Here, 
we reach the same conclusion—“an action or appeal” has a 
reasonably plain meaning, which does not allow for Appellees’ 
proposed limitation.   
 Appellees’ argument in favor of a limited interpretation 
of “an action or appeal” mistakenly relies on our precedent 
addressing a district court’s exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).  We have stated that 
“where the claim over which the district court has original 
jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must 
decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations 
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties 
provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”  Borough of 
W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(emphasis added); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  Appellees interpret this precedent, particularly the 
use of the word “must,” to “underscore[] the district court’s 
lack of discretion in these circumstances, particularly when the 
dismissal is before trial.”  Appellees’ Merits Br. 23.  But 
Appellees’ interpretation of our precedent elides a district 
court’s discretion to consider factors of “judicial economy, 
convenience, and fairness to the parties” when deciding 
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  See, e.g., 
Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 1999) (“This 
administrative decision is left to the sound discretion of the 
district court, and we review such determinations for abuse of 
discretion, focusing on whether the dismissal of the pendent 
claims best serves the principles of judicial economy, 
convenience, fairness, and comity.”); N. Sound Cap. LLC v. 
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Merck & Co., 938 F.3d 482, 494 n.11 (3d Cir. 2019) (leaving 
for the district court to determine whether to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims 
when the suits were pending for more than five years and had 
resulted in two appeals); see also Charles Alan Wright et al., 
13D Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3567.3 (3d ed. 2019) (“The fact that 
dismissal under § 1367(c) is discretionary—and not 
jurisdictional—is now absolutely clear.”); id. (noting that the 
presumption that a district court will decline supplemental 
jurisdiction when the federal claims are dismissed “is just 
that—a presumption and not a rule”). 
 Relatedly, Appellees request that we “allow district 
courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law 
claims.”  Appellees’ Merits Br. 29, n.17.  This request 
presupposes that there is a rule barring district courts from 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.  
There is no such rule.  As discussed above, our precedent 
makes clear that district courts have the discretion to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims so long as 
certain factors justify doing so. 
 Second, Appellees claim that the combination of a 
textual interpretation of § 1915(g) and the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute will enable a prisoner to make their lawsuits 
“strike-proof” by including state law claims in their complaint.  
Appellees’ position is undermined by the discretion district 
courts currently enjoy to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over a prisoner’s state law claims and dismiss them on grounds 
enumerated in § 1915(g).  Notably, this occurred in at least one 
of Talley’s prior actions.  See Talley v. Griesmer, No. CV 19-
1587, 2019 WL 5787983, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019) (“In 
the interest of convenience and judicial economy, we exercise 
our supplemental jurisdiction and consider Talley’s state law 
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breach of contract claim based upon this same misconduct 
charge.”).  Appellees’ strike-proofing argument is overstated 
and not a sufficient basis for us to deviate from the plain 
meaning of § 1915(g).   
 Third, Appellees suggest that when there is “no viable 
federal law claim to give a district court jurisdiction, the 
inmate’s assertion of supplemental jurisdiction over the state 
claims should be deemed frivolous, thereby warranting a 
strike.”  Appellees’ Merits Br. 27.  Appellees argue that this 
approach comports with our decisions in Byrd and Ball v. 
Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2013), partially abrogated on 
other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015).  
They also contend that this approach is supported by the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 
140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020).  Specifically, Appellees assert that 
after a dismissal of a prisoner’s federal claims for the failure to 
state a claim and in the absence of federal question jurisdiction 
and diversity jurisdiction, a prisoner cannot amend their state 
law claims such that they can bring those claims again in 
federal court.  In this situation, Appellees claim that “[i]t is as 
if the state law claims were dismissed without leave to amend, 
at least for purposes of bringing them again in federal court.”  
Appellees’ Merits Br. 29.   
 As an initial matter, we note that the decision in Lomax 
was grounded in the text of § 1915(g) and as such provides 
little, if any, support for Appellees’ overall position.  Lomax, 
140 S. Ct. at 1725 (“[T]his Court may not narrow a provision’s 
reach by inserting words Congress chose to omit.”).  In Lomax, 
the Supreme Court held that “[a] dismissal of a suit for failure 
to state a claim counts as a strike, whether or not with 
prejudice.”  Id. at 1727.  The Lomax Court created a carveout 
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where a strike is not called when the district court grants the 
prisoner leave to amend the complaint.  Id. at 1724 n.4.   
 Appellees’ desire to deem a prisoner’s state law claims 
as frivolous runs afoul of our precedent regarding the 
appropriate way to dismiss state law claims when declining to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  We have instructed that 
“[i]f a district court decides not to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction and therefore dismisses state-law claims, it should 
do so without prejudice, as there has been no adjudication on 
the merits.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009); 
see also Korvettes, Inc. v. Brous, 617 F.2d 1021, 1024 (3d Cir. 
1980) (“A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is plainly not a 
determination of the merits of a claim.  Ordinarily, such a 
dismissal is ‘without prejudice.’”).   
 We see no reason to overrule our long-settled precedent 
and hold that a mixed dismissal is a determination that the 
prisoner’s state law claims are frivolous.  An adjudication of 
the merits of the prisoner’s state law claims, which is what 
deeming those state law claims as frivolous would be, is 
premature.  A district court’s decision to decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction is not a determination of the merits 
of those state law claims. 
 Fourth, Appellees argue that a literal interpretation of 
§ 1915(g) leads to the “absurd results” of a mixed dismissal not 
being grounds for a strike and a prisoner being able to strike-
proof their actions by including a state law claim, so we ought 
to apply the absurdity principle articulated in Holy Trinity 
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).  Appellees’ 
Merits Br. 30, 36.  Appellees point us to the approaches taken 
by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pointer v. Wilkinson, 
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502 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2007) and the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Thomas v. Parker, 672 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2012).   
 In Pointer, the Sixth Circuit held “that where a 
complaint is dismissed in part without prejudice for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies and in part with prejudice 
because ‘it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted,’ the dismissal should be counted 
as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).”  502 F.3d at 377.  In 
Thomas, the Tenth Circuit held that a prisoner accrued a strike 
when a district court dismissed two claims for failure to state a 
claim and dismissed the remaining claims for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.  672 F.3d at 1183.  Both the Sixth and 
Tenth Circuits relied on their view that the purpose of 
§ 1915(g) “would be subverted if prisoners could skirt its 
procedural bar merely by appending unexhausted claims to a 
complaint otherwise subject to summary dismissal on the 
merits[,]” in support of their holdings.  Pointer, 502 F.3d at 373 
(quoting Clemons v. Young, 240 F. Supp. 2d 639, 642 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003)); Thomas, 672 F.3d at 1184 (citing and quoting 
Pointer and Clemons).   
 We have previously rejected the holdings of Pointer and 
Thomas.  In Ball, we addressed “whether dismissal of some 
claims within an action on grounds that would constitute a 
strike, without dismissal of the entire action, causes the 
prisoner to accrue a strike.”  726 F.3d at 463.  We relied on our 
holding in Byrd as settling the question and requiring the 
dismissal of the entire action or appeal on an enumerated 
ground or a statutory provision that is limited to the same 
grounds.  Id. at 464.  We stated that this approach was 
consistent “with the plain language of the PLRA’s three strikes 
provision, which refers to dismissals of an ‘action or 
appeal,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), rather than the dismissal of 
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individual claims.”  Id.  Our holding in Ball, accordingly, 
requires us to reject the holdings of Pointer and Thomas as well 
as Appellees’ position that a mixed dismissal should constitute 
a strike.   
 Further undermining Appellees’ reliance on Pointer and 
Thomas is the weight of authority from our sister Circuit 
Courts of Appeals suggesting that the holdings in Pointer and 
Thomas are outliers.  The D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
have answered the question before us and both held that mixed 
dismissals are not strikes.  Fourstar, 875 F.3d at 1150–51 
(“Does a case count as a strike when a district court dismisses 
a prisoner’s federal claims for failure to state a claim, or as 
frivolous or malicious, but declines to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the prisoner’s state-law claims?  The answer 
is no.”); Harris, 935 F.3d at 674 (“We follow the D.C. Circuit 
and hold that a dismissal due to the district court’s decision not 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims 
does not qualify the case as a strike under the PLRA.”).   
 The Seventh, Fourth, Fifth, and Second Circuits have 
confronted similar questions of whether a strike can be called 
when some of a prisoner’s claims are dismissed for reasons 
enumerated in § 1915(g) and other claims are dismissed for 
reasons not identified in the statute, and each of those courts 
held that such a dismissal was not a strike.  See Turley, 625 
F.3d at 1012 (“Our holding today clarifies that a strike is 
incurred under § 1915(g) when an inmate’s case is dismissed 
in its entirety based on the grounds listed in § 1915(g).”); 
Tolbert, 635 F.3d at 651 (concluding that an “‘action’ in 
§ 1915(g) unambiguously means an entire case or suit[,]” and 
“[t]herefore, § 1915(g) requires that a prisoner’s entire ‘action 
or appeal’ be dismissed on enumerated grounds in order to 
count as a strike.”); Brown, 857 F.3d at 291 (finding that a prior 
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dismissal was not a strike because some of the prisoner’s 
claims were dismissed for failing to state a claim while others 
were dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 
because of a lack of evidentiary support); Escalera, 938 F.3d 
at 382 (“We therefore hold, consistent with our sister circuits 
and the plain language of § 1915(g), that a prisoner’s entire 
‘action or appeal’ must be dismissed on a § 1915(g) ground to 
count as a strike under the PLRA.  Accordingly, mixed 
dismissals are not strikes under the PLRA.”).   
 Given the clarity of the language of § 1915(g) regarding 
when a court can call a strike and our ability to apply the plain 
meaning of that language to the instant appeal, we need not, as 
Appellees suggest, resort to considerations of statutory purpose 
and legislative history to resolve the question before us.  See 
Byrd, 715 F.3d at 123 (“Statutory purpose and legislative 
history may be referenced only if the statutory language is 
without a plain meaning, i.e., if the statutory language is 
ambiguous.”).  But if we were to do so, our holding would be 
guided by the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
(the inclusion of one is the exclusion of others).  See N.L.R.B. 
v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 940 (2017).  This canon 
suggests that by expressly including three grounds for calling 
a strike in § 1915(g), Congress intend to exclude all other 
grounds as a basis for calling a strike.   
 This interpretation of the statute is bolstered by the fact 
that when Congress updated § 1915 to include what is now 
subsection (g), it also added subsection (e)(2), which provides 
that a “court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 
determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or 
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be 
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 
is immune from such relief.”  Prison Litigation Reform Act of 
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1995, Pub. L. No. 104-34, § 804, 110 Stat. 1321–73, 74 (1996).  
Because the four grounds for a sua sponte dismissal under 
§ 1915(e)(2) include the same three grounds for calling a 
strike, by negative implication, we could infer that Congress 
intended the three enumerated grounds in § 1915(g) to be the 
exclusive grounds for calling a strike.  SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. 
Ct. at 940 (“The force of any negative implication, however, 
depends on context.  The expressio unius canon applies only 
when circumstances support a sensible inference that the term 
left out must have been meant to be excluded.”); see also Ball, 
726 F.3d at 460 (“But, like failure to exhaust, immunity is not 
one of the enumerated grounds for a strike under § 1915(g), 
which indicates that Congress did not intend for dismissal on 
immunity grounds to count as a strike.”). 
 We disagree with Appellees’ view that holding that a 
mixed dismissal is not grounds for a strike would produce an 
absurd result or one at odds with Congress’s intent.  The 
language of Section 1915(g) is clear and identifies the grounds 
for calling a strike—a mixed dismissal is not included among 
those grounds.   
* * * 
 We end where we began, with the text of the statute.  
Section 1915(g) provides that a strike accrues when an “action 
or appeal . . . was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, 
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted[.]”  As we stated in Byrd, a strike accrues only if the 
“entire action or appeal is dismissed explicitly” for one or 
more of those three grounds or “dismissed pursuant to a 
statutory provision or rule that is limited solely to dismissals 
for such reasons, including (but not necessarily limited to) 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or 
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Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”  Byrd, 
715 F.3d at 126 (emphasis added).  We, accordingly, hold that 
a mixed dismissal is not grounds to call a strike.   
 Given our holding, we conclude that § 1915(g) does not 
bar Talley from proceeding IFP in the instant appeal.  The cases 
that Appellees identify as strikes—Varner I, Talley v. 
Mazzocca, and the District Court’s dismissal in the instant 
matter—are mixed dismissals and not strikes.5  We will now 
address the merits of Talley’s appeal.   
B. Talley’s Appeal 
 The District Court found that Talley’s claims related to 
the alleged false and fraudulent nature of the Settlement 
Agreement were subject to dismissal because Davis had 
entered a permissible appearance on behalf of Worstell by 
signing and filing the answer.  The District Court also found 
that Talley’s RICO and constitutional claims were meritless 
because the Settlement Agreement was never actually filed on 
the docket.  Because the District Court found that Talley’s 
federal claims were meritless and amendment would be futile, 
it denied Talley leave to amend.  The District Court declined 
 
5 Varner II, a summary affirmance of a mixed dismissal, is also 
not a strike.  See Ball, 726 F.3d at 464 (stating that the 
affirmance of a dismissal is not a strike because “[u]nder the 
plain language of the statute, only a dismissal may count as a 
strike, not the affirmance of an earlier decision to dismiss.” 
(quoting Jennings v. Natrona Cnty. Det. Center Med. Facility, 
175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir.1999))).   
20 
 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Talley’s state law 
claims, dismissing them without prejudice.   
 On appeal, Talley presents several overlapping 
arguments that address two primary issues:  (1) whether the 
District Court abused its discretion when denying his motion 
to amend and (2) whether the District Court abused its 
discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over his state law claims.  We address each issue in turn.  
 First, Talley contends that the District Court should 
have granted him leave to amend his complaint because the 
factual and legal basis of some of his claims had changed.6  
Specifically, he argues that his proposed Amended Complaint 
 
6 We “review a district court’s decision not to grant leave to 
amend for abuse of discretion.”  Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 
366, 376 (3d Cir. 2020).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(a)(2) provides that a district court should “freely give leave 
[to amend] when justice so requires.”  Despite this “liberal 
standard,” “leave to amend may be denied when there is ‘undue 
delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility.’”  
Spartan Concrete Prod., LLC v. Argos USVI, Corp., 929 F.3d 
107, 115 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 
113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Amendment would be futile when 
“the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.”  Shane, 213 F.3d at 115.  When 
“assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same 
standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).”  
Id.  Thus, when “a claim is vulnerable to dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6), but the plaintiff moves to amend,” as occurred here, 
“leave to amend generally must be granted unless the 
amendment would not cure the deficiency.”  Id.   
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(“PAC”) would have addressed his deficient allegations 
regarding Davis’s failing to enter an appearance and thereby 
depriving the District Court of personal jurisdiction over 
Worstell.  In the PAC, Talley “clarified that it was in fact 
Attorneys Rogers, Davis, and Defendant Worstell’s failure to 
return a waiver of service of summons that divested the District 
Court of authority over Defendant Worstell’s person . . . and 
undermined the District Court’s ability to enter judgment 
against—or, as here, in favor of—Defendant Worstell.”  
Appellant’s Br. 6–7.  
 Neither the District Court nor the Magistrate Judge 
addressed Talley’s new allegations regarding the failure to 
return a waiver of service of summons when addressing 
whether to grant Talley leave to amend.  Nevertheless, the 
Magistrate Judge addressed the substance of this issue because 
Talley raised it as an argument in opposition to Appellees’ 
Motion to Dismiss.  See J.A. 27–28 n.9.  The Magistrate Judge 
concluded that Talley’s argument was unpersuasive because 
the defendants in Talley II waived any challenge to service and 
personal jurisdiction when they filed an answer in that matter.  
Id.  
 We agree with the Magistrate Judge and conclude that 
Talley’s new allegations do not cure the deficiencies of his 
complaint.  Simply put, Talley’s new allegations do not alter 
the conclusion that by filing an answer to Talley’s complaint 
the defendants in Talley II, including Worstell, could no longer 
raise a challenge to the district court’s personal jurisdiction 
over them.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (stating that certain 
defenses, including “lack of personal jurisdiction” are waived 
if not raised in a motion made under Rule 12 or by failing to 
include it in a responsive pleading, such as an answer); see also 
In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 921 F.3d 98, 105 (3d 
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Cir. 2019) (“Precedent of the Supreme Court and this Court 
further holds that the right to assert a personal jurisdiction 
defense can be affirmatively and implicitly waived through 
conduct.”).  While Talley also argues that the District Court 
clearly erred when finding that amendment of his complaint 
would have been futile, this argument is based on the Talley II 
court’s alleged lack of personal jurisdiction over Worstell and 
fails for the reason just discussed.  We, accordingly, find that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion when denying 
Talley leave to amend.   
 Second, Talley argues that the District Court’s dismissal 
of his claims was based on the “faulty” premise that the 
Settlement Agreement was not actually filed in the District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.7  Appellant’s Br. 
13.  Talley is incorrect.   
 
7 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).  St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster Gen. 
Hosp., 967 F.3d 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2020).  “[I]n deciding a 
motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint 
must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of 
them.”  McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 
2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  To 
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) “motion to dismiss, a complaint 
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  When assessing the complaint, “we are 
mindful of our ‘obligation to liberally construe a pro se 
litigant’s pleadings,’ particularly where the pro se litigant is 
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 As the District Court explained, the Settlement 
Agreement (as distinguished from the Motion to File Under 
Seal, which the Settlement Agreement accompanied) was not 
filed on the publicly available docket.  Rather as a “document 
pending sealing decision,” the Settlement Agreement was 
“submitted to the Clerk with a motion to file the document 
under seal,” and “is kept separate from other documents and is 
not made available for inspection by any person except as 
permitted by order of the court.”  LCrR 49(b)(2); J.A. 13.   
 While we are required to accept the allegations in 
Talley’s complaint “as true, ‘we are not compelled to accept 
unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a 
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’”  Morrow v. 
Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013), as amended (June 
14, 2013) (en banc) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 
187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).  Talley asks us to infer that by filing 
the Motion to File Under Seal with the Settlement Agreement 
as an exhibit, Enerson filed the Settlement Agreement.  This 
inference is unwarranted, and we will not draw it in Talley’s 
favor in light of the fact that the Settlement Agreement was not 
filed and remains unavailable on the public docket.  We, 
therefore, will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Talley’s 
claims to the extent they are predicated on the filing of the 
Settlement Agreement.   
 Third, Talley contends that the Magistrate Judge and the 
District Court failed to address his allegations regarding the 
disclosure of the Settlement Agreement to Cassidy Neal, an 
 
imprisoned.”  Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citation omitted) 




attorney representing a defendant in Talley II and other actions 
Talley has brought.  Talley avers that the District Court’s 
failure to consider whether “the mailing of a true and correct 
copy of” the Settlement Agreement was a breach of a clause of 
the Settlement Agreement and warrants reversal and remand.   
 Talley is correct that the District Court and Magistrate 
Judge failed to address his allegations regarding the alleged 
disclosure of the Settlement Agreement to Neal.  We, 
nevertheless, will affirm the District Court’s dismissal based 
on our own review of the pleadings.  Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 
121, 123 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We may affirm a District Court’s 
judgment on grounds other than those considered by the 
District Court itself.”).  Talley does not allege that the 
disclosure of the Settlement Agreement to Neal supports any 
of his federal claims.  See Compl. ¶¶ 46–55; PAC ¶¶ 41–53.  In 
fact, he only references the disclosure of the Settlement 
Agreement in support of his state law breach of contract claim 
in the Complaint and in support of the breach of contract and 
promissory estoppel claims in the PAC.  See Compl. ¶ 56; PAC 
¶¶ 55, 58.  Because we, as discussed below, affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of Talley’s state law claims, we also affirm 
the District Court’s dismissal of Talley’s breach of contract 
claim to the extent it arises out of the alleged disclosure of the 
Settlement Agreement to Neal.   
 Fourth, Talley raises several arguments regarding how 
the elements of each of his federal claims, as pled in the PAC, 
are satisfied.  But the District Court and Magistrate Judge never 
considered whether the elements of Talley’s federal claims 
were satisfied because “the gravamen of his pleading 
effectively remains unchanged” between the Complaint and 
the PAC.  J.A. 35.  The Magistrate Judge concluded that the 
claims asserted in the PAC rested “on the fatal propositions 
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that . . . Worstell did not have an entry of appearance, or waiver 
of service form, filed on his behalf when Talley executed the 
Agreement, and that . . . Enerson attached the [Settlement] 
Agreement to his motion to file under seal.”  J.A. 35.   
 We agree with the Magistrate Judge’s assessment of the 
PAC and agree that the PAC “fails to otherwise allege any 
additional, well-pled facts that would give rise to a plausible 
legal claim against the [Appellees].”  J.A. 35.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the District Court’s denial of Talley’s Motion to 
Amend.  
 Fifth, Talley states that we should reverse and remand 
the District Court’s order with instructions for the District 
Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law 
claims.8  The basis of this request is Talley’s view that his only 
obligation under the Settlement Agreement was to allow the 
complaints in Talley I and Talley II to be dismissed and that if 
he successfully prosecuted his breach of contract claim, to 
secure relief from that obligation, the District Court would 
have had to reopen Talley I and Talley II.  Talley contends that 
if he is not allowed to pursue his state law claims, he will be 
deprived of “constitutionally adequate ‘process’” because no 
state court could compel a federal court to reopen a closed or 
dismissed case.  Appellant’s Br. 19.   
 Talley’s argument fails because Talley’s prayer for 
relief in the Complaint and the PAC did not request that the 
 
8 We review a district court’s decision not to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for abuse of 
discretion.  Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 
805 F.3d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) 
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District Court reopen Talley I and Talley II.  Compl. ¶¶ 64–77; 
PAC ¶¶ 60–77.  Talley, instead, only requested an injunction 
voiding the Settlement Agreement.  Compl. ¶ 73; PAC ¶ 62.  
Also, if Talley seeks to reopen Talley I and Talley II, he bears 
the burden of seeking relief from the relevant orders or 
judgments in those cases.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (providing 
that a “court may relieve a party or its legal representative from 
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for” enumerated 
reasons).  The point being that if Talley were to successfully 
prosecute his state law claims, without regard to whether he 
does so in a federal court or a state court, he must take 
additional actions in his prior suits if he seeks relief from the 
judgments in those matters.  As a result, Talley is incorrect, and 
the District Court did not need to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over his state law claims due to the possibility that 
he would prevail on those claims.  The District Court, 
therefore, did not abuse its discretion when declining to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Talley’s state law 
claims.   
IV. Conclusion 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will grant Talley’s 
motion to proceed IFP and affirm the District Court’s order.   
